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FOREWORD
 
The report which follows reflects the results of a joint effort
 
of the National 
Savings and Loan League, under contract to AID,

and the Korea Housing Bank.
 
The study was undertaken as a part of the analysis of housing
finance in Korea pursuant to the agreement between AID and the
 
Economic Planning Board of the Government of the Republic of Korea.
 
The objective of the study was to carry out an analysis of the

existing operational procedures of the Korea Housing Bank in order
 
to develop specific recommendations for improvements in its
 
operational efficiency, including cash flow management, savings

mobilization, and liability and asset management, with the specific
 
purpose of identifying actions which could be taken by the KHB to
 
expand its activities among low-income groups.
 
The initial field work was carried out during the period from April 24
 to May 8, 1978, by Mr. Sun Won Kang, Chief, Foreign Loan Section of

the Korea Housing Bank, and Mr. John M. O'Brien, Consultant to the
National Savings and Loan League and President, Central Pennsylvania

Savings Association. Further analysis and preparation of the final
draft report were carried out in Washington by Dr. James Christian,

Senior Vice President, and Mr. Howard Kane, Financial and Management

Analyst, National Savings and Loan League.
 
While the findings and recommendations of the report have been discussed
 
with representatives of the Korea Housing Bank, the report is not to
be interpreted as the official position of either the Bank or of the
 
Agency for International Development.
 
We hope, however, that the Korea Housing Bank will find the report

useful as it develops and implements its policy and operational
 
procedures.
 
Peter Kim
 
Director
 
Office of Housing
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
The Korea Housing Bank (KHB) was established in 1967
 
as a quasi-governmental institution, dedicated primarily to
 
the mobilization of domestic saving and to the provision of
 
long-term home financing for low-- and moderate-income
 
families.
 
The KHB is organized as a centralized institution with
 
a nationwide branch network, which by the end of 3.977 
had
 
grown to 50 branches and 25 subbranches. Approximately 2,900
 
people are employed by the KHB.
 
The KHB is fundamentally a depository institution, offer­
ing demand, savings, and time deposits, including several
 
installment savings plans. In addition, the KHB issues tax­
exempt housing debentures and enjoys the proceeds of the
 
compulsory sales of National Housing Bonds. National Housing
 
Bonds alone accounted for 30 percent of outstanding KHB
 
liabilities at the end of 1977.
 
During its relatively short eleven-year history, the KHB
 
has grown into the fifth largest housing finance system in
 
the developing world, with assets at the end of 1977 of
 
US$826.9 million. While the growth of the Korean economy has
 
been nothing short of spectacular over this same period, with
 
per capita gross national product rising from US$156 at the
 
end of 1967 to US$864 at the end of 1977, KHB assets have
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grown at roughly twice the rate of growth of the Korean
 
economy. While general. economic growth accounts in large
 
measure for the KHB's performance over the past decade, the
 
strength of the demand for housing, the priority attached to
 
housing in government policy, and the strong saving tradition
 
among the Korean people, together with an effective KHB savings
 
mobilization effort, must be considered as important addi­
tional causal factors.
 
The 1977-78 AID Housing Guaranty Program for Korea placed
 
emphasis on the housing finance components of the shelter
 
delivery system, with a view toward increasing the availability
 
of long-term housing finance for low-income families. The
 
program was designed for implementation in two phases, the
 
first focusing on policy decisions affecting housing finance.
 
Implementation of the second (1978) phase of the program is
 
contingent upon the demonstration of acceptable progress by the
 
Government of the Republic Of Korea and the KHB in implement­
ing the 1977 program and the policy decision attendant thereto, as
 
well as the development of operating policy and procedures by the
 
KHB to provide mortgage financing more effectively to lower
 
income families.
 
The present study was undertaken as a part of the analysis
 
of housing finance in Korea preparatory to implementation of
 
the second phase of the 1977-78 Housing Guaranty Program.
 
Pursuant to the agreement between AID and the Economic Plan­
ning Board of the ROKG, this study was designed to
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. . . carry out the analysis of KHB's existing operations
 
and procedures with the objective of developing specific
 
operational recommendations for KHB consideration in terms of
 
achieving improved efficiency of its operations, cash flow
 
management, savings mobilization, and lending programs and
 
procedures. A major purpose of this analysis is to identify
 
specific actions, procedures, and policies KHB could imple­
ment to increase savings and lending programs directed at the
 
low-income group."
 
The context in which this study was carried out has an
 
important bearing on the findings and the recommendations.
 
Generally, housing supply had been unable to keep pace with
 
housing demand. Consequently, construction costs and land
 
costs have been rising rapidly. Construction costs, for
 
example, have risen 118% over the 1975-77 period, or 3.4
 
times the 27% increase in the consumer price index during the
 
same period. Average residential construction costs per m2
 
which were W34,598 (US$71.50) in 1975 had risen to W75,341
 
(US$155.66) in 1977, such that a 40 m2 house which cost
 
W1,383,920 (US$2,859) to build in 1975 would have cost
 
W3,013,640 (US$6,226) in 1977, exclusive of the cost of the
 
land. Part of this increase can be attributed to materials
 
shortages, particularly cement, which became so acute in
 
May 1978 that construction of various types ol structures,
 
including large single-family dwellings, was prohibited by the
 
ROKG. In spite of substantial increases in family income
 
during the recent period, construction cost increases and
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supply shortages on the scale presently being experienced in
 
Korea have made home acquisition particularly difficult for
 
low-income families.
 
Furthermore, KHB's ability to respond to these circumstances
 
has been limited by the Monetary Stabilization Policy of the
 
ROKG, which was prompted by a dramatic reversal of the net
 
foreign asset position of the Bank of Korea (BOK), the central
 
bank. In 1974 and 1975, the BOK showed negative net foreign
 
asset balances of W118,312 million (US$244 million) and
 
W160,939 million (US$332 million), respectively. In 1976 and
 
1977, however, these balances turned sharply positive, to
 
W391,625 million (US$809 million) and to W785,006 million
 
(US$1,622 million), respectively. To prevent a massive up­
ward surge in the domestic money supply, the Monetary Stabili­
zation Policy was implemented to neutralize these net inflows.
 
At the same time, the ROKG instituted an import liberaliza­
tion program to bring net foreign financial inflows into line
 
with domestic monetary policy, and it is anticipated that as
 
the import liberalization policy takes hold in 1978, the
 
Monetary Stabilization Policy will be relaxed.
 
Meanwhile, however, the effect of the Monetary Stabili­
zation Policy on the KHB has been profound. The policy was
 
applied to the financial sector by increasing the amount of
 
deposits which financial institutions were required to hold
 
with the BOK. During 1977, deposits of the KHB with the BOK,
 
net of borrowing from the BOK, rose by 712.6%, from 7.1% of
 
assets to 28.6% of assets. Indeed, almost all of the
 
-5­
W99.8 billion increase in net savings inflows experienced by
 
the KHB in 1977 was absorbed by the KHB's reserve balance with
 
the BOK; this balance increased in 1977 by W98 billion.
 
Although there is some evidence of relaxation of the Monetary
 
Stabilization Policy in early 1978, inasmuch as the BOK ab­
sorbed only W68.4 billion cf the W110 billion increase in
 
savings flows during the first quarter of 1978, reserves of
 
the KHB on deposit with the BOK still increased to 34% of
 
assets. Thus, the Monetary Stabilization Policy remains an
 
important aspect of the current environment in which the KHB
 
is operating.
 
In assessing the past and current performan-e of the
 
KHB, there is much to praise. The savings mobilization effort
 
has been impressively successful, and except for the period
 
during which the Monetary Stabilization Policy has been in
 
effect, the KHB has consistently maintained a ratio of
 
housing loans to total assets in excess of 70%. 
 The results
 
of the present study nevertheless suggest several areas of
 
KHB operations and policy which could be improved. It is,
 
therefore, with a view toward strengthening the financial
 
viability of the KHB and broadening its market to include a
 
larger number of low-income families that the following recom­
mendations are offered.
 
RECOMMENDATION 1
 
The weakest aspect of KHB performance is to be found in
 
its capital account, which provides the key indicators of a
 
financial institution's soundness and cost effectiveness.
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Capital provides a cushion against losses from operations
 
and, thus, insures the institution's survival. Measures of
 
capital adequacy are subjective, but one rule of thumb which
 
is generally accepted is that a huucing finance institution
 
should have net worth (capital) equal to approximately 5% of its
 
assets. Sometimes this ratio is refined to 5% of risk assets to
 
suggest that solvency could be maintained if no more than 5%
 
of risk assets had to be written off because of default. That
 
is, the institution would still be able to pay all of its
 
creditors (depositors) by liquidating all of its assets and
 
writing off the defaults against its net worth.
 
The KHB has displayed a net worth to total assets close
 
to 5% during the 1973-76 period, but in 1977, the ratio fell
 
drastically to 3%. Although the authorized capital of the
 
KHB was increased on 1 January 1978 from W10 billion to
 
W50 billion, the fact that the ratio of net worth to total
 
assets has been declining almost steadily since 1973 is in­
dicative of the fact that KHB's net earnings have not kept
 
pace with its asset growth. Consequently, maintenance of
 
capital adequacy has come to depend upon new capital to be
 
paid in by the shareholders, in this case the ROKG.
 
The table below contains key ratios reflecting this
 
performance in recent years:
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KHB CAPITAL ACCOUNT RATIOS
 
1973-77
 
Rate of Net 
Earned Surplus 
and Surplus Net Worth 
Return on Reserves to to 
Year Investment Net Worth Total Assets 
1973 0.31% 7.74% 
 6.78%
 
1974 0.24% 11.05% 5.34%
 
1975 0.21% 13.08% 4.23%
 
1976 0.18% 10.14% 4.75%
 
1977 0.43% 18.35% 3.06%
 
By subjective rules of thumb, a mature financial institu­
tion should realize a net rate of return (income after all
 
operating expense) on its portfolio o± earning assets (invest­
ment) of about 1.5% to provide for earnings retention--to
 
increase net worth--to maintain capital adequacy--to permit
 
further growth in assets. Clearly, the KHB is performing
 
below this standard, a fact which is reflected in the ratio
 
of earned surplus and surplus reserves to net worth. After
 
eleven years of operation, the KHB had managed at the end of
 
1977 to accumulate only W2,247 million (US$4.6 million), 
or
 
18% of total net worth, to augment its paid-in capital of
 
W10 billion.
 
There are several possible reasons for such a weak per­
formance. First, the gross spread between the institution's
 
average cost of funds and its average yield on assets may
 
-8­
be too narrow because of the interest rate structure; impru­
dent liability management may be promoting high-cost saving
 
instruments, and/or conservative lending policies may
 
result in carrying an excessive amount of non-earning or low­
yielding liquid assets; 
or the institution may consistently
 
be experiencing default losses; or its administrative and
 
operating costs may be too high relative to the gross spread
 
between the cost of funds and the asset yield. 
The only one
 
of these factors which applies with some force in the case of
 
the KHB is that of administrative and operating cost.
 
For 1976, the only recent year for which carefully con­
structed data are available, the gross spread between the
 
average cost of funds and the average yield on, earning assets
 
amounted to 3.37 percentage points; administrative and operating
 
costs, however, absorbed all but 0.42 points of this spread.
 
Put differently, administrative and operating costs amounted
 
to 25% of gross income. Conventional performance standards
 
for administrative and operating costs suggest a target of around
 
15% of gross income. Given that a gross spread of 3.37 per­
centage points is considered adequate, even generous, the KHB
 
could have retained in 1976 
as much as W2.4 billion if it had
 
held administrative and operating cost to 15% 
cf gross income.
 
The potential earnings retention in this year alone thus could
 
have slightly exceeded the cumulative earnings retention
 
during the KHB's eleven-year history. 
Had the KHB been achiev­
ing the 15% 
target during the 1973-77 period, cumulative re­
tained earnings could have amounted to W12 billion at the end
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of 1977, or 55% of total net worth. Moreover, the ratio of
 
net worth to total assets in 1977 would have been 5.5%, which
 
would have precluded the necessity for the authorization of
 
an additional W43 billion capital subscription.
 
There are at least two additional reasons for contending
 
that the KHB should become more sensitive to its administra­
tive and operating costs. The first of these is that the
 
investment of retained earnings serves to lower the average
 
cost of funds and thereby increase the gross spread or permit
 
more aggressive savings promotion efforts through offering
 
higher yields on deposits. The second reason, and one of far
 
more immediate concern, is that the restructuring of both
 
deposit rates and lending rates which took effect in 1978
 
will probably narrow the gross spread considerably. For 1976,
 
the average cost of funds was 8.16% and the average yield on
 
assets was 11.53%, and while the average cost of funds for the
 
KHB depends significantly on the composition of its liabilities,
 
which bear different interest rates, the average cost of funds
 
in 1978 is expected to reach and perhaps exceed 10%, whereas
 
the average yield on assets is unlikely to exceed 12%. Such
 
a narrowing of the gross spread raises the distinct possibility
 
of net losses unless administrative and operating costs are
 
reduced.
 
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that all
 
aspects of administrative and operating costs be reevaluated by
 
the KHB, but with special attention accorded to the following
 
areas:
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Recommendation 1.1:
 
The KHB, like most housing finance institutions, has two
 
principal cost centers--the liability management section
 
(i.e., funds mobilization and administration) and the asset
 
management section (i.e., loan origination and servicing).
 
Overhead costs incurred by management and other support
 
functions (personnel administration, research, planning, etc.)
 
are allocated between these two cost centers. Absolute costs,
 
including overhead, of the asset management section is con­
sidered to be meeting conventional performance standards. The
 
liability management section (funds mobilization and adminis­
tration) appears, however, to be incurring costs, including
 
overhead, substantially in excess of conventional performance
 
standards. To illustrate, loan origination and servicing,
 
plus allocated overhead cost, amounts to approximately 0.5%
 
of earning assets, which can be considered efficient even by
 
developed-country standards. In this context, such costs
 
should account for approximately 40% of all business and admin­
istrative expense, including oveihead. Yet in the case of the
 
KHB, these costs account for only 22% of business and adminis­
trative expense, plus overhead, while liability management
 
expense accounts for 78%. Given, then, that the costs of asset
 
management are felt to be reasonable in absolute terms, it
 
follows that if total business and administrative expense,
 
including overhead, is deemed excessive, those excess costs
 
must either be incurred directly in liability management or
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indirectly through a combination of excessive overhead costs
 
and/or through an inequitable allocation of overhead costs
 
to the liability management function.
 
The available data do not permit a more precise identi­
fication of whether direct costs or indirect costs (overhead)
 
attributed to liability management is the more appropriate
 
target for cost reduction. It is clear, however, that if the
 
absolute costs of asset management were held to their 1976
 
levels and if these costs had represented 40% of total
 
business and administrative expense, the costs attributed to
 
liability management would have been less than half their
 
actual level (Wl.633 billion vs W3.800 billion). Moreover,
 
the level of total business and administrative cost incurred
 
in 1976 would have fallen from its actual level of W4.960
 
billion to W2.722 billion. This lower level of cost would
 
have represented 14% of gross income, slightly below the
 
conventional performance standard of 15%.
 
Recommendation 1.2
 
In a general sense, the KHB has a large staff relative
 
to its total assets. At the end of 1977, the KHB had 2,900
 
employees and W400.1 billion in assets 
(US$826.9 million), or
 
slightly more than 7 employees per billion won of assets, which is
 
about 7 times the number of employees which would be found in
 
a comparably sized U.S. housing finance institution, including
 
a comparably sized branch network. 
Such a U.S. institution
 
would have about 400 employees, the equivalent of 1 employee
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per billion won of assets. Of course, the comparably sized
 
U.S. institution would be heavily computerized; the opportunity
 
to computerize operations, however, presently exists for the
 
KHB.
 
KHB planning currently calls for the expansion of its
 
branch network to 120 offices and 5,400 employees by the end
 
of 1981. To achieve comparability with U.S. institutions
 
in its staffing level, the KHB would have to reach W5,400
 
billion (US$11 billion) in assets by the end of 1981, the
 
possibility of which is difficult to conceive.
 
It is recommended, therefore, that the KHB proceed as
 
rapidly as possible with the computerization of operations
 
while substantially revising downward its plans to increase
 
staff. Implementation of this recommendation should serve to
 
lower operating costs generally and particularly in the lia­
bility management section, where one teller terminal could
 
easily preclude the necessity for the involvement of four
 
different employees in each transaction, as presently practiceu.
 
Recommendation 1.3
 
As part of an overall program of cost reduction, it is
 
recommended that the KHB reconsider its present method of
 
overhead allocation, which appears to be based on some form
 
of inventory analysis (e.g., the number of appraisals made by
 
a cost center, number of cash slips processed, etc.). Although
 
probably accurate and conceptually sound, the procedure is
 
burdensome and time consuming. Consequently, cost data are
 
published with about a six-month lag. At this point, the
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information is mainly of historical interest and does not
 
contribute significantly to planning, policy formulation, or
 
managerial control.
 
Whatever method is employed, full computerization of
 
cost analysis should reduce the time lag in the availability
 
of these data. Nevertheless, it is felt that a somewhat
 
simpler method of overhead allocation than the one presently
 
in use would facilitate managerial cost control and thereby
 
improve the cost efficiency of KHB operations.
 
Recommendation 1.4
 
It is recognized that the branch expansion program of
 
the KHB has virtually been mandated by the ROKG in conjunction
 
with its overall economic development effort. Perhaps as a
 
consequence, the criteria for branch expansion appears to
 
give little attention to the financial viability of new
 
branches.
 
It should be emphasized that it is further understood
 
that the ROKG, as the major shareholder, with 85% of the stock
 
of the KHB, has every right to ignore financial viability in
 
establishing new branches if it chooses to do so. 
 Neverthe­
less, from a financial point of view, given the present levels
 
of costs incurred by the KHB, it is recommended that the ROKG
 
and the KHB proceed with branch expansion only after careful
 
consideration has been given to the probable financial viability
 
of each branch. Implementation of this recommendation need
 
not necessarily alter any of the branch expansion plans of the
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KHB, but it would insure that each new branch had been evalu­
ated in terms of the likelihood of its making a positive
 
contribution to retained earnings and net worth.
 
Recommendation 1.5:
 
Even though the asset management section (loan origination
 
and servicing) is considered to be operating cost-efficiently,
 
it is recommended that serious consideration be given by the
 
KHB to recovering at least some of the costs of loan origina­
tion from the borrower at the time of closing of the loan.
 
Such charges are known conventionally as "commitment fees" or
 
"closing costs" and their collection is common practice among
 
housing finance institutions in most parts of the world.
 
These costs are presently absorbed by the KHB, rather than
 
passed on to the borrower. Implementation of this recommenda­
tion would permit the KHB to recover some of its business and
 
administrative cost by means other than cost reduction in the
 
liability management section.
 
It is clearly understood that collection of such charges
 
is not a part of Korean financial tradition. It is also
 
understood, however, that Korean banking law does not forbid
 
the practice. Given, then, that such charges are common
 
mainly among housing finance institutions and given that the
 
KHB is the housing finance institution in Korea, it would seem
 
to follow that the KHB is in a position to establish financial
 
tradition as it relates to housing finance.
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RECOMMENDATION 2
 
The KHB was established with the explicit ". . . primary
 
purpose of supporting the formation of capital in favor of low
 
and moderate income housing and assuring the effective supply
 
and management of housing funds" (KHB, The Korea Housing Bank--

Its Functions and Activities, 1978, p. 7). The Housing
 
Promotion Law of 1974, however, places minimum size limits of
 
12 py (40 m2 ) on the housing units which the KHB is permitted
 
to finance. Given the substantial increase in construction
 
costs which has occurred in Korea in recent years, however,
 
a 40 in housing unit is scarcely affordable by an urban family
 
receiving income equivalent to the median of the urban income
 
distribution. Over the 1975-77 period, residential construction
 
costs rose by 118%, such that the 40 m2 unit which cost
 
W1,383,920 (US$2,859) to build (exclusive of land) in 1975 cost
 
W3,013,640 (US$6,226) in 1977.
 
From year-end 1975 to year-end 1977, median family income
 
grew by 62.7%--a very significant increase, but still sub­
stantially below the increase in construction costs. (Median
 
family incomes used in this illustration are W61,832 per month
 
at year-end 1975 and W100,602 per month at year-end 1977.)
 
Givenihese data and assuming KHB loan terms of 100%
 
financing of the construction cost, land cost considered to
 
be the homeowner's equity or downpayment, 20-year loan
 
maturity, 14% interest, arid repayment on a conventional,
 
level-payment basis, a 40 m2 housing unit would have absorbed
 
28% of the monthly median income in 1975 and 35% in 1977.
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Put differently, assuming the same loan terms but restricting
 
the allowable percentage of income devoted to mortgage repay­
ment to 25%, a 40 m2 housing unit in 1975 would have been
 
affordable by families at the 60th percentile of the income
 
distribution and above, but in 1977, a 40 m2 unit would have
 
been affordable only by families at the 75th percentile and
 
above. Clearly, the rate of increase of construction costs
 
and the rigidity of the law which limits the minimum size
 
unit which can be financed by the KHB to 12 py (40 m2 ) are
 
forcing the KHB away from the income groups which it was
 
established to serve and which are still considered 
 to be its
 
primary clientele.
 
The specific recommendations which follow are offered in
 
the interest of permitting the KHB to achieve its primary
 
purpose of facilitating homeownership for low- and moderate­
income families.
 
Recommendation 2.1:
 
It is understood that Korean aspirations, given Korea's
 
particularly strong economic growth performance over the last
 
decade, point toward higher housing standards, in terms of
 
size and quality of construction. Inasmuch as improvement in
 
the standard of living is the fundamental objective of
 
economic growth, the opportunity to enjoy higher housing
 
standards should not be denied to those who can afford
 
those standards. Social and economic equity, however, which
 
should also be a fundanmental purpose of economic growth and
 
development, argues against denying improved housing standards
 
to all who participate and contribute to the economic growth
 
and development of the nation.
 
As noted above, the effect of the 12 py (40 m2 ) minimum
 
size limit imposed by the Housing Promotion Law has been to
 
deny direct access to KHB financing to those families below
 
the 75th percentile of the income distribution. In so doing,
 
the law fails to recognize the potential for innovative con­
struction technologies and for self-help approaches to improving
 
housing conditions.
 
Whether or not the KHB ever finds it prudent to offer
 
financing for housing units smaller than 12 py, the law should
 
not prohibit the bank from making that decision.
 
Accordingly, it is recommended that steps to taken to
 
eliminate the minimum-size limitation from the Housing
 
Promotion Law.
 
Recommenda!ion 2.2:
 
Innovation in facilitating access to improved housing need
 
not be limited to physical solutions. Financial innovations
 
are also possible. Graduated Payment Mortgage (GPM) plans
 
have been proved successful by the Korea National Housing
 
Corporation (KNHC) in conjunction with an earlier AID Housing
 
Guaranty Program, and illustrative GPM approaches have been
 
developed recently for the KHB.
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GPMs have the characteristic of lowering initial
 
payments below the amount required of a borrower under a
 
conventional level-payment mortgage. Subsequent payments
 
under the GPM increase along a predetermined schedule which
 
assumes that the increases in payments will not exceed the
 
increases in the borrower's income. GPM schedules also pro­
vide for the financial institution a rate of return at least
 
as great as that borne by conventional mortgages. Access to
 
housing finance can thus be provided to borrowers whose
 
current incomes are too low to afford conventional level
 
payments without jeopardizing the financial institution's
 
rate of return.
 
GPMs, however, have special cash flow configurations;
 
during the early years of the loan the cash flow to the
 
institution is less than, and during the later years greater
 
than, the cash flow from a comparable conventional (i.e.,
 
level-payment) mortgage. This characteristic poses special
 
problems for an institution like the KHB which is already
 
generating a limited retained earnings stream from its con­
ventional mortgage portfolio.
 
Even considering that the substantial block of funds
 
being held by the KHB with the BOK under the provisions of
 
the Monetary Stabilization Program could provide the resources
 
for a massive GPM lending program, the KHB would be ill-advised
 
to convert these funds into GPMs, given its present cost
 
structure. Any substantial amount of GPMs absorbed into the
 
KHB portfolio at this time would serve to reduce the KHB cash
 
flow in the near term and possibly induce a decline in net
 
worth, hence in the capital adequacy of the KHB.
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This could nevertheless be carried forward if the ROKG
 
paid in capital against the new level of authorized capital
 
at a rate at least sufficient to compensate for declines in
 
net worth attributable to the near-term cash flow character­
istics of the GPMs. Such an approach would, however, weaken
 
the incentive of the KHB to improve that cost structure, the
 
if no steps were taken to improve the cost structure, the
 
performance profile of the KHB, as reflected in the capital
 
account, would continue to appear weak.
 
The AID Housing Guaranty Program loan offers a near-term
 
solution to this dilemma. The terms of this loan are likely
 
to be more favorable than the 1978 average cost of funds to
 
the KHB. Employment of the proceeds of this loan in a GPM
 
lending program would enable the KHB to develop and refine
 
the techniques attendant to GPM lending and to begin to
 
reestablish the KHB's market among low-income families while
 
the necessary cost reforms were carried out. Assuming, say,
 
a two-year implementation phase, the KHB would, by the end
 
of 1980, be prepared to launch a significant GPM lending
 
program using its own funds to resume its lending to low­
and moderate-income families.
 
Accordingly, it is recommended that steps be taken to
 
secure the AID Housing Guaranty Program loan for the purpose
 
of initiating GPM lending to low-income families prior to the
 
completion of the cost reduction program outlined under
 
Recommendation 1.
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Recommendation 2.3:
 
Home improvement loans represent another means of facili­
tating access to improved housing for low-income families, and
 
although the KHB is authorized to grant such loans, it has not
 
in fact promoted them nor do home improvement loans represent
 
a significant portion of the KHB portfolio. As of the end of
 
1977, home improvement loans outstanding accounted for only
 
0.3% of the portfolio.
 
Given the fact that the origination and servicing of
 
hone improvement loans probably contribute proportionately
 
more to origination and servicing costs than mortgage loans
 
and given that the KHB already has cost problems, it is
 
recommended that the KHB maintain its present policy with
 
regard to home improvement loans.
 
It is further recommended, however, that the KHB take
 
the initiative in wholesale lending for such purposes in order
 
to contribute to expanded access to housing finance for
 
lower income families.
 
Loans to other institutions (i.e., wholesale lending) is
 
the most cost-efficient type of loan which the KHB currently
 
makes. As such, an expansion of this type of lending should
 
contribute to improving the flow of KHB retained earnings as
 
well as to reestablishing the KHB's low- and moderate-income
 
market.
 
The AID Housing Guaranty Program loan contains provisions
 
for allocating some of the loan proceeds to this type of
 
activity. The KHB could take advantage of these funds to open
 
-21­
new channels for wholesale lending, for example, with the
 
Korean credit union system.
 
Recommendation 2.4:
 
Korean banking law presently forbids the assignment,
 
sale, or pledging of mortgages, a feature which effectively
 
precludes any potential for establishing a secondary mort­
gage market in Korea.
 
Although the strength of the capital market in Korea
 
offers the opportunity for sale of secondary mortgage market
 
instruments and could, therefore, provide an important supple­
mentary source of funds for housing finance, a major change
 
in Korean banking law will have to be made to go forward in
 
this direction.
 
It is recommended, therefore, that a detailed study of
 
the Korean capital market be made to ascertain its absorptive
 
capacity for secondary market instruments and the likely terms
 
upon which such instruments would trade prior to taking any
 
steps to revise the law.
 
THE KOREA HOUSING BANK:
 
AN ANALYSIS OF POLICY AND OPERATING PROCEDURES
 
I. KHB OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND POLICIES
 
Since 1973, the assets of the Korean Housing Bank (KHB)
 
have increased at an annual compounded rate of 42.1% so that
 
by year-end 1977, total 
assets were W400.2 billion (US$826.9
 
million). Assets increased by more 
than 70% between 1976
 
and 1977. 
 The rate of asset growth is not, however, the sole
 
determinant of a financial institution's success. Fulfill­
ment of objectives, sources and uses of funds, maximization
 
of returns, and management policies must be considered in
 
order to adequately assess an institution's track record and
 
strengths.
 
A. Asset Management
 
1. Types of Loans Offered: The KHB places the
 
majority of its loans into long-term financing of new housing
 
construction. These housing loans fall into two general cate­
gories: national housing loans and private housing loans.
 
a. National housing loans are made to 
local govern­
ments, the Korean National Housing Corporation (KNHC), and
 
building contractors whose projects have been approved by the
 
Ministry of Construction. These loans can be made only with
 
funds raised through the sale of national housing bonds, reve­
nue generated through housing lotteries, and through certain
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principal repayment reinvestments. At the end of 1977, these
 
loans comprised slightly more than 50% of the KHB loan port­
folio.
 
b. Private housing loans are made to individuals
 
who have successfully subscribed to one of two types of con­
tract savings plans which can have a contract term of up to
 
5 years. On December 31, 1977, private housing loans accounted
 
for 41.5% of all KHB lending. This type of loan is also found
 
tinder the following categories:
 
i. Partnership housing loan: a loan to a
 
housing association or cooperative that will build more than
 
20 units on one site. The partnership must be composed of co­
workers who must meet the same requirements of a private housing
 
construction loan. Information was not readily available to
 
indicate the actual KHB activity in this type of loan.
 
ii. Company housing loan: a loan to an enter­
prise that will build more than 20 units and sell them to
 
employees at prices below cost. These loans presently repre­
sent a small percentage of KHB lending.
 
iii. Builder's housing construction loan: a
 
loan to a builder to construct more than 50 units and sell them
 
to the general public. No information was available to indi­
cate total lending in this category.
 
c. Other forms of loans can also be made by the KHB.
 
Although these loans are primarily housing related, they have
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not been promoted as much as the long-term construction
 
loans.
 
i. Existing house purchase: a loan to a
 
private individual for the purpose of purchasing a primary
 
residence. The applicant must qualify by meeting the require­
ments of one of two types of contract savings plans of up to
 
2 years in term. Available information indicates that this
 
type of lending plays a very small role in the total KHB
 
housing loan program.
 
ii. Home improvement loans: this loan is
 
made for the purpose of repairing or expanding an existing
 
home over 2 years old. The total floor area cannot exceed
 
2
 
85 m after the remodeling is completed. At the end of 1977,
 
these loans totalled only W555,000 or 0.2 of 1% of total KHB
 
assets.
 
iii. Housing site development loans (lot loans):
 
this loan is made to individuals for the purpose of acquisition
 
and development of a housing lot not to exceed 12,000 m2. The
 
borrower must intend to build his own house on the site. 
 KHB
 
investment in this type of loan has been virtually nonexistent.
 
At the end of 1977, no lot loans were included in their port­
folio. Recently, however, probably due to a rapidly rising
 
land prices in Korea, the KHB has registered a significant
 
number of applications for this purpose.
 
iv. Housing construction material production
 
loans: a loan to a firm for the production of housing
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materials or for funding the management of a construction
 
materials facility. The last time this type of loan was made
 
was 1974; none currently exists on KHB books.
 
v. Commercial loans: these loans are made primarily
 
to KHB customers who have contributed substantially to the
 
bank's funds mobilization. These loans can take the form of
 
discounts on bills, overdrafts, loans against installment
 
savings accounts, or collateralized or non-collateralized loans.
 
These loans earn the bank betveen 15% and 18% per year and
 
currently comprise almost 8% of KHB loans outstanding.
 
2. Loan Terms: Table 1 gives the terms on housing loans.
 
Almost all the long-term loans have a 20-year term including a
 
1-year grace period. The home improvement loans and lot loans
 
carry terms of 5 and 10 years, respectively. Interest rates
 
were standardized at the beginning of 1978 so that individuals
 
will pay 14% on their loans; corporations and builders will pay
 
slightly higher rates.
 
Loan-to-value ratios as shown in Table 1 are mislead­
ing by U.S. standards. In Korea, mortgage loans involve the
 
mortgagee (lender) taking back two mortgages for one loan. One
 
mortgage is placed on the land and one is placed on the im­
provements. As such, the loan-to-value ratios as stated by
 
the KHB account only for the amount of the loan against the
 
value of the house. Land values in urban Korea are high and
 
can account for as much as 50% of the total value of a
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house/land package. Therefore, an 80% loan-to-value ratio
 
by KHB standards is actually as low as a 40% loan by U.S.
 
standards.
 
Moreover, it does not appear that the KHB accepts
 
lien subordinations in granting first-mortgage loans; the
 
loan applicant's lot must be paid off before the KHB will
 
make a loan. Thus, a large percentage of KHB mortgage cus­
tomers have as much as 60% equity in their property at the
 
time of loan settlement.
 
The 14% interest rate (20-year term) that the KHB
 
grants on almost all of its end-user loans was implemented
 
in early 1978 so as to begin a nationwide standardization
 
policy and also to bring rates more in line with prevail­
ing money and capital market conditions. In previous years, 
KHB loan rates varied widely (4% to 18%), as did amortiza­
tion periods. 
In accord with the 1974 National Housing Promotion
 
Law, limits were set on the maximum and minimum size of
 
homes eligible for financing by the KHB. National Housing
 
loans made to municipalities and the KNHC appear to
 
limit home sizes from a minimum of 7 pyeong (23.1 m2 ) to
 
a maximum of 15 pyeong (49.5 m2). Housing loans made out
 
of Bank funds (savings mobilized, housing debentures, and
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other nonpublic sources) presently limit home sizes to
 
a minimum of 12 pyeong (40 m2 ) to a maximum of 25.7
 
pyeong (85 m2).
 
3. Asset Portfolio Management: As previously
 
mentioned, asset growth within the KHB has been signif­
icant, registering an annual average rate of increase of
 
42.1% from 1973 through 1977. However, the composition of
 
the KHB's assets has been changing.
 
Table 2 and Table 3 show the KHB's 1973-77 con­
solidated balance sheets and the KHB's portfolio growth
 
history respectively. During 1977, housing loans outstand­
ing decreased as a percentage of assets, moving from 64.5%
 
in 1976 to 52.2% in 1977. Since year-end 1975, total loans
 
as a percentage of assets has shown a decline, dropping
 
from 79.0% to 62.1% in 1977.
 
The main reason for this has been the Monetary
 
Stabilization Policy of the Ministry of Finance. Under
 
this policy the KHB has been required to deposit with the
 
Bank of Korea (BOK) large amounts of funds mobilized,
 
above the normal KHB reserve requirements that are held by
 
the BOK. These deposits earn approximately 12% per annum
 
for the KHB. Between 1976 and year-end 1977, total
 
deposits with the BOK increased by 591.0%.
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In 1976, these deposits totalled W16.578 billion,
 
or 7.1% of the KHB's total assets; by year-end 1977, the total
 
was W114.557 billion, making up 28.2% of total assets. During
 
the first three months of 1978, deposits with the BOK grew to
 
W183 billion (US$378 million) or over 34% of total KHB assets.
 
With the KHB's discretion limited by present ROKG
 
policy, absolute cash flow maximization cannot be achieved due
 
to the lower rate of interest accruing on the sequestered funds
 
and to the fact that reinvestment opportunities have been cur­
tailed. Therefore, considering the environment in which the
 
KHB is working, cash flow optimization should be pursued by
 
maintaining a satisfactory equity position as a cushion against
 
losses. Although the KHB is not an institution oriented
 
totally towards profit, as noted in the 1978 KHB functions and
 
activities report, capital growth, in proportion to asset growth,
 
is important in assuring an institution's solvency. For ex­
ample, if 5% of an institution's assets go into default, the
 
institution's ratio of net worth to assets must be at least 5%
 
to prevent bankruptcy.
 
In January 1978, the KHB's authorized capital was
 
increased from W10 billion to W50 billion. The capital will.be
 
paid in between 1978 and 1981. Based on current assets, this
 
injection of capital will bring the equity ratio up to a very
 
stable 13%. However, a continuation of this practice will only
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serve to make the KHB's financial viability suspect, especially
 
in the eyes of international lenders.
 
Within the discretion available to the KHB in the
 
field of asset management is their ability to monitor principal
 
repayments and reinvestments from their present loan portfolio.
 
The KHB sources and uses of funds statement covering 1973-77 is
 
presented in Table 4. Under "sources of funds" in Table 4 are
 
shown principal repayments collected on loans during the year.
 
When measured against the corresponding year's average loans
 
receivable, a portfolio turnover rate can be derived. In 1977,
 
the turnover rate was 6.83%, meaning that the portfolio has an
 
approximate life of 14 to 15 years. This portfolio life
 
expectancy is high compared to U.S. standards (10 to 12 years).
 
Because the "loans collected" amount is an aggregate, including
 
repayments on short-term commercial loans, the KHB average life
 
of the housing loans is probably even higher than 15 years.
 
The turnover rate has been lower in previous years,
 
ranging from 6.21% in 1973 to 4.48% in 1975. One reason for
 
the low turnover rates is fairly obvious: with the KHB offering
 
savings rates on some accounts that exceed the interest rates
 
they charge on mortgages, there is likely no incentive for a
 
homeowner to prepay his loan (see section I-B).
 
Although the 1977 portfolio turnover rate shows
 
an improvement over previous years, the KHB should begin closer
 
monitoring of principal recuperations with the goal of increas­
ing them to a predetermined amount.
 
-30-

B. Debt Management: Sources of Funds
 
1. Customer Accounts: Customer savings accounts and
 
deposits have always comprised by far the largest percentage
 
of KHB funds sources. In 1977, these accounts reached almost
 
W200 billion and funded over 49% 
of the bank's assets. These
 
accounts can be classified into three types:
 
a. Demand deposits: Comprising 7.4% of total funds
 
sources, these accounts are withdrawable upon customer demand.
 
There are basically six types, including checking accounts,
 
passbooks, and household deposits which pay savers interest as
 
high as 10%.
 
b. Time deposits: There are eight types of time
 
deposits with maturities as high as 5 years. Included in these
 
forms of accounts is the Fortune Formation savings account with
 
contract rates as high as 16.2%. These accounts made up 34.2%
 
of KHB sources of funds at year-end 1977.
 
c. Housing Installment savings deposit: This is the
 
account that the KHB has stressed as its principal instrument
 
for mobilizing funds for housing loans. It is 
a contract form
 
of savings that qualifies individuals for housing loans.
 
Interest rates range between 9% and 15% per annum. 
In 1977,
 
HIDs, as they are commonly called, accounted for nearly 6% of
 
total KHB sources of funds.
 
2. National Housing Bonds (NHBs): These bonds are be­
ginning to play and important role in KHB funds sources. Since
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1973, when the bonds accounted for 9.5% of funds sources, the
 
number of NHBs sold grew significantly, such that at year-end
 
1977 they totalled W118.4 billion and accounted for nearly 30%
 
of the sources of funds. These bonds are redeemable in 5 years
 
and pay the holder 6% per annum. NHBs are compulsory purchase
 
instruments for conducting most forms of business in Korea.
 
For example, their purchase is a requirement in the process
 
of obtaining liquor licenses, opening a "tea room," or pur­
chasing firearms. As such, the KHB can enjoy the proceeds from
 
the sale of these bonds in almost direct proportion to the
 
economy's growth rate. There appears to be an intent by the
 
ROKG to raise the interest paid on these bonds from 6% to 12%
 
sometime in 1978.
 
3. Housing Debentures: Once representing a major source
 
of funds (20.1% in 1973), housing debentures have not been pro­
moted in recent years. As of December 31, 1977, they totalled
 
W13.0 billion and made up only 3% of funds sources. The deben­
tures paid the holder ROKG-guaranteed principal and interest
 
as high as 21.9% (tax free) over a 3-year term and as such
 
represented an extremely high-cost money source for the KHB.
 
4. Other Sources of Funds: These include housing lot­
teries, borrowing from the BOK, and reserves and capital.
 
C. Debt Portfolio Management
 
In monetary terms, the growth of customer deposits in
 
the KHB has been enormous. The average compounded growth rate
 
from 1973 through year-end 1977 was nearly 45%, moving from
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W44.5 billion to W196.4 billion (US$405.8 million). The KHB
 
annual savings growth target have been exceeded in practically
 
every year. The largest year for savings growth was 1977,
 
when a 103.3% increase was realized. This increase was due
 
primarily to new customer deposits. Although current informa­
tion is not available, it is estimated that total number of
 
accounts increased from 838,393 to over 1,200,000.
 
Accurate cost-of-money figures for 1977 were not yet
 
available. Cost data for 1976, however, did reflect a total
 
weighted average cost of money of 8.16%. Given that the
 
weighted average yield on assets was 11.53% for the same year,
 
the KHB's gross operating spread came to 3.37%. Compared
 
against similar data for other developing countries, this
 
spread is adequate.
 
Under the interest rate restructuring program, the KHB
 
is setting all housing loan rates at 14%, which should in­
crease their weighted average yield on assets close to this
 
mark. However, in discussions held with KHB personnel, it was
 
disclosed that the savings rate reorganization will likely
 
raise the cost of money close to 13%. Although this informa­
tion is not concrete, it nevertheless leads one to believe
 
that the KHB's operating spread will be reduced in the future.
 
Although savings programs, closely linked to govern­
ment policy, have proved enormously successful as a source
 
of funds, they have also made the KHB vulnerable to changes in
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in their operating spread should deposit composition change
 
drastically. A good example of this is the Fortune Formation
 
savings program, newly implemented in 1976. Under this type
 
of savings account, an individual contracts to deposit a fixed
 
sum each month (not to exceed 30% of his income) for terms
 
ranging from 2 to 5 years. The KHB pays the depositor interest
 
as high as 16.2% per annum depending on the length of the
 
contract term.
 
In addition to KHB interest, the depositor also
 
receives a government bonus and sometimes a voluntary bonus
 
paid by his employer. Savers under this program can then earn
 
as much as 31% per year on their deposits.
 
Since 1976, when the program was introduced, Fortune
 
Formation accounts have grown rapidly, increasing from
 
325,302 accounts with paid-in installments of W10.5 billion to
 
488,715 accounts and paid-in installments of W40.6 billion by
 
year-end 1977. This type of savings accounted for nearly 21%
 
of total KHB savings balances during 1977, while only making
 
up 11% of savings in 1976. Savings migration out of lower
 
paying savings accounts into this type of higher paying account
 
could serve to raise the KHB's average cost of money and reduce
 
their operating spread. From all available information, how­
ever, this does not appear to be taking place, although the
 
potential exists.
 
Nevertheless, while accepting the coincidence of high­
interest-rate savings accounts and the Monetary Stabilization
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Program, the KHB should be formulating liability management
 
plans of action in the event their cost of funds rises to
 
insupportable levels.
 
II. KHB ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
 
A. Cost of Asset Management
 
The KHB's loan underwriting procedures are outlined
 
in detail in Appendix A. The procedures appear adequate, and
 
similar in some respects to accepted U.S. methods, especially
 
with regard to private construction loans. Credit review
 
procedures appear satisfactory in light of extremely low delin­
quency rates KHB is experiencing (0.3 of 1% as of December 31,
 
1977). Loan processing time also appears adequate, with in­
dividual private construction loans taking 15 hours apiece to
 
underwrite and National Housing Construction loans accounting
 
for 106 hours per loan. The NHC loans probalbly take longer to
 
underwrite due to the project nature of this form of lending.
 
For these reasons, KHB loan underwriting is rated as satis­
factory in terms of procedure, thoroughness, and time consump­
tion.
 
The KHB supplied costs calculated from their 1976 opera­
tions. As previously mentioned, the 1977 costing procedure
 
had not been finished during the fieldwork. Table 6 breaks
 
down the costs of originating and servicing each major risk
 
asset category. Although the figures apply to 1976, originat­
ing and handling costs as a percentage of portfolio balance
 
can probably be applied to 1977 as well.
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Of the total business and administrative expenses of
 
W4.956 billion for 1976, risk asset origination and servicing
 
costs totalled W1.090 billion or 22%. Salaries amounted to
 
W0.747 billion and other expenses (supplies, indirect costs)
 
totalled W0.342 billion.
 
One major item to come out of the cost study was that
 
the cost of originating and servicing home mortgage loans was
 
only 1/2 of 1% of the total average loans receivable. Out of
 
this, costs were broken down as follows:
 
Cost of Origination 
Type of Loan and Servicing 
All Housing Loans 0.50% 
NHB Proceeds Loans 0.05% 
Lottery Proceeds Loans 0.11% 
Private Housing Loans 0.97% 
GOK Borrowing Loans 0.22% 
The NHB proceeds loans are the least costly of all
 
types of housing loans due probably to the wholesale aspect of
 
this type of lending.
 
Commercial loans represented the highest cost loans
 
in terms of originating and servicing. In 1976, these costs
 
accounted for 3.3% of the average loan balance. Interest rates
 
reflected these higher costs in that the average weighted yield
 
on commercial loans was 16.21%, nearly 5.5% higher than the
 
average yield on housing loans.
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It would be very difficult to make recommendations
 
for improving direct cost efficiency in asset mairtenance
 
because the costs do not appear excessive and because time did
 
not allow the obseivation of each transaction that would occur
 
in this area of the KHB. One item, however, was apparent--the
 
costs 	of loan origination were not separated from the costs of
 
servicing. This distinction could possibly give KHB manage­
ment a better cost planning tool.
 
B. 	 Cost of Debt Management
 
The cost of mobilizing funds ranks as the highest of
 
all attributable costs within the KHB. Using the data supplied
 
in Table 7, it can be sean that the total cost to mobilize
 
1976's debt was 2.29% of the average sources of funds. This is
 
much higher than the 0.66% it takes to maintain assets of the
 
same amount. Certain categories of funds sources cost much
 
more than they could earn for the KHB. For example, Fortune
 
Formation savings deposits handling costs are, on the average,
 
14.44% of the total amounts mobilized. When the interest paid
 
on this account is added, total costs amount to 29.74%, 15.74%
 
above what these funds can earn when invested in mortgages.
 
Another type of account, the "Children's Deposit," cost a full
 
86% of the amount mobilized. Together with interest paid, the
 
cost was 93.89%. Salaries alone, attributable to this source
 
of funds, were in excess of interest paid.
 
One reason for these high costs might be the nature
 
of the accounts. Fortune Formation savings accounts have only
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been in existence since 1976 and are being promoted heavily
 
by the bank. Extra advertising expenses and the cost of adding
 
staff to handle these fast-growing accounts are probably in­
creasing the cost attributable to Fortune Formation account
 
maintenance under the KHB costing system. In the case of the
 
Children's Deposit, ,iccount sizes are just not cost effective.
 
As of December 31, 1976, the KHB was maintaining more than
 
54,000 Children's Deposits, totalling only W283 million. This
 
translates to an average account balance of only W5,200
 
(US$10.75). However, Children's Deposits, while perhaps not
 
being a cost-effective savings instrument, are nevertheless
 
important because they tend to promote and maintain what is
 
already a strong savings tradition among the Korean people.
 
Costs are high, however, throughout the savings depart­
ment. This suggests that the procedures used in this
 
department could be a cause. The procedures employed by the
 
KHB in processing savings accounts is outlined in Appendix B.
 
Deposit and withdrawal servicing is an extremely cumbersome
 
procedure involving four staff members for each transactions
 
(teller, cashier, accounting machine operator, assistant mana­
ger). In the United States, one teller with an on-line com­
puter terminal is used for each type of transaction. This is
 
definitely an area in which the KHB could begin to employ its
 
computer. Implementation costs for the on-line terminals
 
would be high, but in the long run economies of scale would
 
come into play as the capital investment was recuperated through
 
reduction in account servicing costs.
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The KHB should also consider reducing direct costs
 
by reducing the number of employees per 1 billion won. This
 
can be accomplished by keeping the present-sized staff as the
 
KHB continues to grow. Clerical staff functions were observed
 
to fall within a narrow ralge of responsibilities. By ex­
panding staff responsibilities the same number of people could
 
do more work and managers would be allotted more time for over­
signt and supervision. It also appears that there exists too
 
much compartmentalization among the various departments. In
 
other words, one department will perform a single function and
 
nothing more. By merging some departments, functions would
 
become integrated and more responsibilities would be assumed
 
by fewer people.
 
C. Overhead Costs
 
The KHB's method of overhead allocation differs from the
 
normally accepted practice of using common costs among cost
 
centers as the distribution basis. Under this concept, costs
 
not related to direct banking functions (i.e., top management
 
salaries, personnel department, appraisal department) are
 
accumlated into what is called an overhead pool. A method must
 
be found to allocate these costs among various bank activities
 
(cost centers) on an equitable basis. The conventional dis­
tribution method is the basis of common costs existing among
 
the various cost centers. For example, assume an organization
 
has two cost centers. 
 The first cost center has total salaries
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and fringe benefits of $75,000 and the second has the same costs
 
of only $25,000. Under this basis, the first cost center would
 
be allocated 75% of the overhead pool and the second would
 
receive 25% as expenses.
 
The overhead distribution procedure employed by the
 
KHB likewise divides various nonbanking sections into overhead
 
departments (pools), but the distribution basis, while difficult
 
to understand, appears to be based on some form of inventory
 
analysis (e.g., the number of appraisals made by a cost center).
 
While this method is perhaps accurate, the procedure
 
is burdensome and time consuming. As a result, actual cost
 
data are not published by the KHB until 6 months after a year's
 
close of business. This does not serve KHB management in any
 
useful way, for the current year is half over before they
 
receive information which might be used productively for plan­
ning and managerial control.
 
A more useful method of overhead allocation would be
 
to convert to a common cost system and maintain it on a current
 
basis. Again, the KHB computer system could prove useful and
 
cost effective in this regard.
 
APPENDIX "A"
 
PRIVATE HOUSING LOAN PROCEDURE
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APPENDIX "A" (Cont.) 
CONTRACTOR'S LOAN PROCEDURES
 
1. Receipt of loan application
 
(a) 	Loan application will be received during the period from March until
 
December.
 
(b) 	Eligibility for application:
 
(1) Contractor intending to build more than 50 housing units in a
 
housing site and to sell the units to homeless families.
 
(c) 	Documents needed for loan application:
 
(1) 	Loan application forms
 
(2) 	Resolution of Board of Directors
 
(3) 	Housing project program
 
(4) 	A copy of registration of judicial person
 
(5) 	A copy of land terrier
 (6) A copy of business tax payment certificates
 
(7) A layout of building construction, a ground-plane, a cross­
section
 (8) 	 By-laws of the contractor 
(9) 	 A copy of builder's license 
2. Credit Analysis of the prospective borrower
 
(a) 
Credit Research Department will conduct an examination of the documents
 
submitted, managerial ability to carry out housing project, marketability

of the houses to be sold by the contractor, the location of housing pro­ject, etc., and also visit the contractor's office to look into the
 
present operation and to find any problems associated with the housing

project, and also analyze financial statements, the ability to repay the
 
loan. 
After finishing the procedures above mentioned, the result of the
 
examination will be forwarded to the branch concerned.
 (b) 	Technical Services Department will go to the place where the housing pro­ject 	is going to be undertaken and examine the suitability of the place

for housing construction project.
 
3. Submission of preliminary application of loan (a) 
The Branch concerned will submit preliminary application of loan with the
 
result of credit analysis and examination of housing site appended.

(b) 	Credit Control Department will examine:
 
(1) 	The prospective borrower's capability to carry out housing project

and financial ability to raise funds needed for housing project
(2) 	The contents of the application form submitted whether they are
 
consistent with the Bank's housing loan policy or not
 (3) 	The location of housing project and the future project of the sale
 
of housing units to be built under the project
 
After completing a variety of examinations above mentioned, the
 
Credit Control Department will give notice of the preliminary
 
approval of loan application to the branch office concerned.
 
4. 
The Branch office concerned will request the Technical Services Department to
 
carry out technical exanination on the project, associated with structural
analysis, construction cost breakdown, design drawing, and specification. 
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5. Technical Examination (a) Technical Services Department will examine the rationality of documents 
submitted in their contents
 
(b) Technical Services Department will examine whether the design drawing is
 
legal or not in terms of laws concerning construction
 (c) Technical Services Department will examine expenses of construction
 
After completing the above examinations, the Technical Services Department will
 
send the results of the examination to the Branch concerned.
 
6. 
The Branch concerned will apply for the loan with loan application forms and
 
other necessary documents required.
 
7. 
The Credit Control Department will carry out overall examination on the loan

application and place it under the review of loan Review Committee.
 
8. 
The Credit Control Department will send approval of loan application to the
 
Branch concerned.
 
9. 
Preliminary measures taken by the Branch concerned prior to loan disbursements:
 (a) Creation of mortgage on the land at the public office
 (b) The Branch concerned will request the Technical Services Department to 
confirm completion of construction work
 
10. 
The procedures that follow after completion of the above procedures are the
 
same as the case with private housing construction loans.
 
11. Loans for purchasing housing units built by the contractor:
 
(a) 
The Branch concerned requests the contractor to submit the names of
 
prospective purchasers
(b) The Branch concerned requests the prospective purchaser to submit docu­
ments necessary for loan application

(c) The Branch concerned appraises the value of the housing units
(d) Loans made to purchasers will be used for compensating the loan repayment

of contractor to the bank 
APPENDIX "A" (Cont.)
 
NATIONAL HOUSING CONSTRUCTION LOAN PROCEDURE
 
1. 	Credit Control Department will receive a request from the Ministry of
Construction, asking the Bank to investigate the projector's capability

of carrying out housing projects. The Credit Control Department will

request the Credit Research Department to analyze the projector's

credit standing and the Technical Services Department to examine hous­ing sites on which to build houses. After receiving the results of

examinations from the abofe two departments, the Credit Control
 
Department will give notice to the Ministry of Construction of a

comprehensive opinion on the projector and its housing project.
 
2. 
After the Credit Control Department has received an approval of the
housing project from the Ministry of Construction, the Department will
 
give notice to the Branch concerning the approval.
 
3. 	The Branch concerned will notify the projector of the fact that the
housing project has been approved by the Ministry of Construction. The

projector will submit loan application forms to the Branch concerned,

and 	the Branch will apply for the loan to the Credit Control Department.
 
4. 	The Credit Research Department will examine the coincidence of the loan
 
application submitted by projector with the approval of housing project

from the Ministry of Construction. Also, the Department will examine
if there would be any deficiency of loan application forms in preserving
loan claims. After examining the above matters, the Credit Control

Department will notify the Branch concerned of the fact that the loan
 
application has been approved.
 
5. 	Loan Closing:
 
The Branch concerned will take procedures for preserving loan claims
including creation of mortgage on land. 
The procedures that follow are
the same as the case with private housing construction loans.
 
APPENDIX "B"
 
SAVINGS MOBILIZATION PROCEDURE
 
1. Savings Mobilization Plan
 
(a) The Savings Promotion Department will prepare the savings mobilization
 
plan in which the target amount of mobilization, by type of deposit,
is set, under the consideration of the accomplishment attained in the

preceding year and operational program for the year concerned, followed
by the allotment of target amount 
for each branch to mobilize, at the
 
beginning of the year concerned.
 (b) 	The allotment of target amount to each branch will be made under the
 
consideration of those factors as the increasing rate of average balance
in the preceding year, the number of personnel, and surrounding condi­
tions under which the Branch is placed.

(c) 	The Savings Promotion Department will establish savings promotion strategy
for deposits (demand and time and savings deposits) and installment 
deposits.
 
2. Advertisements for Savings Mobilization
 
(a) 	The Savings Promotion Department will collect data necessary for establish­
ing savings mobilization plan and analyze them.
 
(b) 	Basic advertisement program will be formed
 
(c) 	Advertising in newspapers or using other news media
 
(d) 
Evaluating the effect of the advertisement
 
3. Deposit Servicing
 
(a) 	Receipt of deposit:
 
(1) 
Teller receives money or checks from the depositor at the window with
 
passbook or certificate of deposit
(2) 	Teller makes a slip on which deposit amount is written down and passes
 
it to a cashier
 
(3) 
Passbook and ledger will be sent to accounting machine calculator
(4) 	Cashier will calculate the money deposited and send it to accounting
 
machine calculator 
(5) The accounting machine operator types the amount of deposit on the
ledger and passbook in accordance with the slip sent by cashier
(6) 	The operator will send the passbook and ledger with slip to an
 
Assistant Manager concerned 
(7) 	The Assistant Manager will confirm the amount credited to the ledger
with that of passbook and slip(8) The Assistant Manager concerned will send the passbook to the teller
 
and the teller will give it to the depositor
(b) 	 Withdrawal of deposit: 
(1) The teller will receive passbook and slip on which the amount of
 
(2) 
withdrawal is written, and the teller will give him a number-plate

The teller will identify the coincidence of the seal impression on

the ledger with that 
on the slip for withdrawal and pass them on to
 
the accounting machine operator 
(3) 	 The operator, after typing the withdrawal amount on the ledger in
accordance with the slip, sends them to an Assistant Manager concerned.(4) The Assistant Manager will identify the coincidence of the seal impres­
sion on the slip with that printed on the ledger and send the passbook
 
and ledger to cashier
 (5) The cashier will pay the amount requested after receiving the number­
plate
 
,'
 
APPENDIX "B" (Cont.)
 
4. Miscellaneous operation inidental to deposit servicing(a) 	Sending checks and bills uncleared to the clearing house and receiving

checks and bills presented through the clearing house
 (b) 	Issuing cashier's checks and paying the check
 
(c) 	Issuing certificate of outstanding balance to a customer
 (d) 
After closing the door, each section calculates the total amount of the
 
transaction made during the day and confirms the aggregate amount with
 
that 	of the accounting section.
 
(e) 	Transferring deposit amount between branch offices
 (f) 	Calculating the interest amount accruing from each account at 
a certain
 
interval of frequency
 
(g) 	Settling the accounts
 
(h) 	Making a variety of reports to be submitted to head office concerned
 
/
 
TABLE I 
KHB TERMS ON HOUSING LOANS
 
1977
 
A. Construction Loans including Purchasing Loan (Loan Ceilings)
 
In thousand won
 
by region
 
.region Large cities Other cities Other than (A)
 
type of dwellin (A) (B) and (B)
 
Single Detached House up to 2,500 up to 2,200 up to 1,800
 
Row House 
 up to 2,000 up to 1,800 up to 1,500
 
Apartment
 
Larger than 12 "pyong"
 
up to 15 "pyong" 
 up to 2,200 up to 2,000 up to 1,800
 
Larger than 15 "pyong"
 
up to 20 "pyong" up to 2,500 up to 2,200 up to 1,800
 
Larger than 20 "pyong"
 
up to 25.7 "pyong" up to 3,000 up to 2,500 up to 2,200
 
Note: 1 not applicable to loan for company house construction.
 
2 The large cities include Seoul, Busan, Incheon, Masan and the capital
 
city of each province.
 
B. Loans for House Purchase
 
a. Single detached house: same as construction loan.
 
b. Row house: up to 1,500,000 won.
 
c. Apartment unit: up to 1,800,000 won.
 
C. Loans for House Remodeling
 
a. for expansion: up to 1,000,000 won.
 
b. for repair: up to 500,000 won.
 
D. Loans for Acquisition of Housing lot
 
Up to the contract amount of Welfare Housing Installment Deposit, but
 
not exceeding 2,000,000 won.
 
Table 1 continued: 
Other Terms 
Type of loan 7"ern. Interest 	 Loan to Loon toClassification 	 rcpayntent rate CoSt ratio valu' ratio 
Private -lousing Construction Loan 	 monthly repayahlc 14% up to 80%./o up to 80%­
lcvcl in 20 ycars 
payment including one 
year of grace 
period 
Partnership Housing Construction montbly repayable in 14% up to 80% up to 80% 
Loan level 20years including 
payment one year of grace 
period 
Company Ilouse to employer loans on up to 3 14% up to 70% up to 80% 
Construction Loan during con- bills years 
based on "Salary struction 
and Wage Earners period 
Fortune Formation to employees .monthly repayable 14% up to 80% up to 80% 
Law" after sale level in 20 years 
payment including one 
year of 
grace period 
Company louse Construction Loan monthly repayable 15.5% up to 80% up to 80% 
based on the Bank's law equal in 10 years 
principal including 6 
payment month grace 
period 
Builder's Housing to builder loans on up to 3 Preferential up to 70% up to 80% 
Construction Loan bills years builder: 15% 
including loan other builder: 
to purchaser 16___/ 
to purchaser monthly repayable 14% up to 80% up to 80% 
level in 20 years 
payment including 
one year of 
grace period 
Loan for Purchase Hlouse monthly repayable 14% tp 10 80'X up to 80m% 
level in 20 years of the value 
psyment including one appraised 
year of grace 
period 
Loan for Remodeling monthly repayable 14% up to 80% up to 80% 
equal in 5 years 
principal 
payment 
Loan for Purchase of Ilousing Lot monthly repayable 14 Yo up to R0% up to 80%
 
level in 10 years
 
payment including 6
 
month leave 
KHB 
COMPARATIVE CONSOLIDATED BALANCE 
1973-1977 
(in billions of Won) 
SHEET 
TABLE 2 
ASSETS 
CASH 
DUE FROM BOK 
SECURITIES PORTFOLIO 
LOANS RECEIVABLE 
PROPERTY OWNED (foreclosed) 
INVESTMZNTS 
DEFERRED ASSETS 
FIXED ASSETS 
OTHER ASSETS 
W 
6.317 
114.557 
8.498 
248.671 
.513 
.020 
.085 
7.705 
13.834 
1977 
% 
1.6% 
28.6 
2.1 
62.1 
0.1 
-
-
2.0 
3.5 
W 
3.209 
16.578 
19.302 
178.377 
.449 
.020 
.066 
5.498 
10.549 
1976 
% 
1.47. 
7.1 
8.2 
76.2 
0.3 
-
-
2.3 
4.5 
W 
3.080 
14.102 
2.368 
132.074 
.604 
.020 
.065 
4.898 
9.932 
1975 
% 
1.8% 
8.4 
1.4 
79.0 
0.4 
-
0.1 
3.0 
5.9 
W 
2.025 
12.827 
.911 
99.114 
.626 
.020 
.011 
3.897 
9.865 
1974 
% 
1.6% 
9.9 
0.7 
76.7 
0.5 
-
-
3.0 
7.6 
W 
1.845 
10.367 
2.726 
75.274 
.690 
.020 
-
3.102 
4.128 
1973 
% 
1.9% 
10.6 
2.8 
76.7 
0.6 
-
-
3.2 
4.2 
TOTAL ASSETS 400.200 100.0% 234.049 100.0% 167.143 100.0% 129.296 100.07 98.152 100.07 
LIABILITIES & CAPITAL 
SAVINGS ACCOUNTS & DEPOSITS: 
- DEMAND DEPOSITS 
- TIME & SAVINGS 
- HOUSING INST. DEPOSITS 
- OTHER DEPOSITS 
BORROWINGS FROM BOK 
SPECIAL LONG TERM BOND ISSUE 
HOUSING DEBENTURES 
NATIONAL HOUSING BONDS 
HOUSING LOTTERIES ISSUED 
LOTTERY PRIZES (unpaid) 
CREDIT GUARANTY RESERVE 
OTHER RESERVES 
OTHER LIABILITIES 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 
29.605 
136.669 
23.039 
7.132 
11.850 
.556 
13.019 
118.385 
-
.212 
.876 
32.309 
14.301 
387.953 
7.47 
34.2 
5.8 
1.8 
3.0 
0.1 
3.0 
29.6 
-
0.1 
0.2 
8.1 
3.6 
96.9 
25.838 
57.048 
11.493 
2.217 
12.050 
.822 
15.067 
67.424 
-
.174 
.676 
18.579 
11.532 
222.920 
11.0% 
24.4 
4.9 
0.9 
5.1 
0.4 
6.4 
28.8 
-
0.2 
0.3 
7.9 
4.9 
95.2 
20.344 
36.381 
8.787 
1.940 
12.170 
1.034 
16.319 
42.116 
-
.1.49 
.,16 
12.963 
7.360 
160.079 
12.2% 
21.8 
5.3 
1.2 
7.3 
0.6 
9.7 
25.2 
-
0.1 
0.3 
7.8 
4.3 
95.8 
13.142 
32.580 
7.204 
1.902 
10.237 
1.060 
19.238 
23.948 
-
.095 
.400 
8.141 
4.446 
122.393 
10.2% 
25.2 
5.6 
1.5 
7.9 
0.8 
14.9 
18.5 
-
0.1 
0.3 
6.3 
3.4 
94.7 
11.850 
25.021 
5.927 
1.717 
10.270 
1.078 
19.734 
9.347 
.089 
.089 
.306 
4.211 
1.858 
91.497 
12.1% 
25.5 
6.0 
1.7 
10.5 
1.1 
20.1 
9.5 
0.1 
0.1 
0.3 
4.3 
1.9 
93.2 
PAID-IN CAPITAL 
RETAINED EARNINGS 
TOTAL CAPITAL 
10.000 
2.247 
12.247 
2.5 
0.6 
3.1 
10.000 
1.128 
11.128 
4.3 
0.5 
4.8 
6.140 
.924 
7.064 
3.7 
0.5 
4.2 
6.140 
.763 
6.903 
4.7 
0.6 
5.3 
6.140 
.515 
6.655 
6.3 
0.5 
6.8 
TOTAL LIABILITIES & CAPITAL 400.200 100.0% 234.048 100.0% 167.143 100.0% 129.296 100.0% 98.152 100.07 
TABLE 3 
W 
1976 # 
HOMES 
KHB: PORTFOLIO GROWTH HISTORY 
1973 - 1976 
(in millions W) 
1975 # 
W HOMES W 
1974 # 
HOMES W 
1973 # 
HOMES 
TYPE OF LOAN: 
HOUSING CONSTRUCTION 
LOTS 
HOUSING MATERIALS PRODUCTION 
50,920 
-
-
43,952 
-
_-
35,938 
-
40,854 
-
-
29,176 
100 
38,417 
-
22,167 
5_­
-
33,429 
COMMERCIAL 
NATIONAL INVESTMENT FUND 
2,912 
6,665 
-
-
1,682 
1,459 
-
-
(534) 
230 
-
-
2,663 
-
-
-
TOTAL LOANS MADE DURING YEAR 
LESS:
PRINCIPAL REPAYMENTS 
PLUS: 
PRINCIPAL BALANCE AT END OF
PREVIOUS YEAR 
60,497 
7,167 
133,249 
43,952 39,079 
5,174 
99,344 
40,854 28,972 
4,903 
75,275 
38,417 24,835 
4,075 
54,515 
33,429 
PORTFOLIO EALANCE END OF YEAR 
INTEREST EARNED ON LOANS 
(RATE (7) ON AVERAGE PORTFOLIO) 
DELINQUENCY AS % OF PORTFOLIO 
186,579 
16,575 
(10.36) 
0.37 
133,249 
12,699 
(10.92) 
0.47. 
99,344 
10,324 
(11.82) 
0.67. 
75,275 
7,130 
(10.99) 
1.07 
TABLE 4 
1977 
KHB: SOURCES AND USES Or 
1973 - 1977 
(in million'W) 
1976 
FUNDS 
1975 1974 1973 
SOURCES OF FUNDS: 
DEPOSITS RECEIVED 
FORTUNE FORMATION DEPOSITS 
HOUSING INSTALLMENT DEPOSITS 
HOUSING DEBENTURES ISSUED 
HOUSING LOTTERIES SOLD 
NAT. HOUSING BOND ISSUE 
GOK BORROWINGS 
LOANS COLLECTED 
RESERVES 
OTHERS 
TOTAL SOURCES 
53,297 
30,091 
11,546 
4,992 
2,380 
50,961 
<-200> 
14,576 
11,258 
5,656 
184,557 
15,642 
10,519 
2,706 
6,514 
2,507 
25,308 
3,740 
7,167 
4,975 
759 
79,837 
11,003 
1,583 
6,785 
2,116 
18,168 
1,936 
5,174 
2,907 
6,569 
56,239 
8,851 
1,277 
7,025 
1,937 
-!-,600 
803 
4,903 
4,985 
2,200 
46,581 
8,857 
1,606 
7,211 
. 
9,347 
2,557 
4,075 
501 
1,335 
35,489 
USES OF FUNDS: 
NHB LOANS 
HOUSING LOTTERY LOANS 
PRIVATE HOUSING CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY HOUSING CONSTRUCTION 
NATIONAL PRODUCTION(housing construction) 
RESERVE REQUIREMENTS 
SUB-TOTAL 
REDEPOSIT AND INTEREST PAID 
COMMERCIAL LOANS 
SMALL LOANS 
NATIONAL INVESTMENT LOANS 
OTHERS (cash, etc.) 
SUB-TOTAL 
TOTAL USES 
42,147 
4,216 
29,697 
712 
-
10,728 
87,500 
8,817 
7,439 
537 
13,902 
66,362 
97,057 
184,557 
28,723 
2,663 
18,652 
882 
_ 
3,182 
54,102 
10,043 
2,912 
_ 
6,665 
6,115 
25,735 
79837 
22,636 
1,955 
11,334 
13 
2,090 
38,028 
11,807 
2,285 
_ 
4,119 
18,211 
56,239 
17,849 
2,880 
8,412 
135 
1,416 
30,692 
9,662 
- 634 -> 
-
6.861 
15,889 
46,581 
8,287 
326 
13,405 
154 
1,683 
23,855 
4,392 
2,663 
-
4579 
11,634 
35,489 
KHB: COMPARATIVE INCOME STATEMENT TABLE 5 
1973 - 1977 
(in millions W) 
1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 
w % w % w % w % w % 
OPERATING INCOME 
INTEREST EARNED: 
LOANS 
DEPOSITS WITH BOK 
OTHERS 
GUARANTY FEES 
32,227 
24,823 
7,349 
55 
194 
95.9% 
73.9% 
21.8 
0.2 
0.6 
18,453 
16,575 
1,852 
26 
138 
94.6% 
85.0 
9.5 
0.1 
0.7 
14,87" 
12,699 
2,145 
33 
-
94.9% 
81.0 
13.7 
0.2 
-
11,215 
10,324 
873 
18 
-
94.2% 
86.7 
7.3 
0.2 
-
8,575 
7,130 
1,197 
248 
-
81.8% 
68.0 
11.4 
2.4 
-
FEES & COMMISSIONS 
HOUSING LOTTERY INCOME 
TOTAL INCOME 
-
1,169 
33,590 
-
3.5 
10.0% 
I 
907 
19,499 
-
4.7 
100.0% 
87 
706 
15,670 
0.6 
4.5 
100.0% 
57 
633 
11,905 
0.5 
5.3 
100.0% 
63 
1,842 
10,480 
3.6 
17.6 
100.0% 
OPERATING EXPENSES 
INTEREST PAID: 
DEPOSITS 
HOUSING DEBENTURE 
OTHERS 
COMMISSIONS PAID 
CREDIT GUARANTY FUND CONTRIBUTIONS 
SECURITIES ISSUING EXPENSE 
DEPRECIATION 
BUSINESS & ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES 
TOTAL EXPENSES 
23,159 
14,785 
1,692 
682 
52 
80 
908 
256 
8,028 
32,483 
71.3% 
45.5 
23.7 
2.1 
0.2 
0.2 
2.8 
0.8 
24.7 
100.07 
13,288 
6,362 
5,098 
1,828 
46 
58 
903 
191 
4,956 
19,442 
68.3% 
32.7 
26.2 
9.4 
0.2 
0.3 
4.6 
1.0 
25.6 
100.0% 
10,083 
5,966 
4,113 
4 
45 
50 
814 
155 
4,218 
15,365 
65.6% 
38.8 
26.8 
-
0.3 
0.3 
5.3 
1.0 
27.5 
100.0% 
7,683 
4,244 
3,431 
8 
35 
39 
732 
116 
3,179 
11,784 
65.2% 
36.0 
29.1 
0.1 
0.3 
0.3 
6.2 
1.0 
27.0 
100.0% 
7,408 
4,128 
3,275 
5 
32 
37 
609 
110 
2,442* 
10,638 
69.6% 
38.8 
30.8 
-
0.3 
0.3 
5.7 
1.0 
23.1 
100.0% 
PROFIT (LOSS) ON OPERATION 1,107 57 305 121 (158) 
NON-OPERATING INCOME 
NON-OPERATING EXPENSES 
100 
13 
165 
19 
186 
184 
265 
138 
438 
43 
EXTRAORDINARY INCOME 222 153 -
DEFENSE TAX 141 28 24 
-
NET PROFIT FOR PERIOD 1,275 328 283 248 237 
NET RETURN ON AVERAGE ASSETS 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0-3% 
*(includes W149 million 
bad loan loss) 
B & A EXPENSES ; AVERAGE ASSETS (%) 2.5% 2.5% 2.8% 2.8% 2.9% 
TABLE 6 
KHB: COST OF ASSET MAINTENANCE 
1976 - BY ACCOUNT 
1 2 3 
(W 000's)
4 5 6 7 8 
AVG. 
BALANCE 
INTEREST 
EARNED 
w RARAE 
-----
---- SALARIES-
% 
H RA 
-
HANDLING COST --------------------
OTHER ---------- TOTAL ----
% 
RAE W RATE 
COST OF RAISING 
FUNDS 
(mobilizing) % 
W RATE 
TOTAL COST 
(5+6) 
7. 
W RATr W 
NET RETURN 
(2-7) 
% 
RATE 
DUE FROM B.O.K. 
SECURITIES 
HOUSING LOANS 
-NHB PROCEEDS LOANS 
-LOTTERY PROCEEDS LOANS 
-PRIVATE HOUSING CONST. LOANS 
-GOVERN4ENT BORROWING LOANS 
2,406,834 
8,297,280 
140,406,062 
(55,850,520) 
(7,108,016) 
(66,104,907) 
(11,342,619) 
288,293 11.98 6,798 
1,225,751 14.77 2,50i 
15,100,341 10.75 482,813 
(4,510,310) (8.08) (17,371) 
(257,309) (3.62) (5,266) 
(9,478,787) (14.34) (444,076) 
(853,935) (7.53) (16,100) 
0.28 3,168 
0.03 1,024 
0.34 222,278 
(0.03) (10,993) 
(0.07) (2,673) 
(0.67) (199,515) 
(0.14) (9,093) 
0.13 
0.01 
0.16 
(0.02) 
(0.04) 
(0.30) 
(0.08) 
9,966 
3,525 
705,091 
(28,364) 
(7,939) 
(643,595) 
(25,193) 
0.41 
0.04 
0.50 
(0.05) 
(0.11) 
(0.97) 
(0.22) 
331,512 
1,142,846 
13,929,903 
(4,068,390) 
(338,058) 
(8,980,103) 
(543,352) 
13.77 
13.77 
9.92 
(7.28) 
(4.76) 
(13.59) 
(4.79) 
341,478 14.19 -53,185-
1,146,371 13.82 79,380 
14,634,994 10.42 465,347 
(4,096,754) (7.34) (413,556) 
(345,997) (4.87) (88,688) 
(9,623,698)(14.56) (-144,911) 
(568,545) (5.01) (285,390) 
-2.21 
0.95 
0.33 
(0.74) 
(-1.2 
(-0.22) 
(2.52) 
COMMERCIAL LOANS 
-BILLS DISCOUNTED 
-OVERDRAFTS 
-INSTALLMENT LOANS 
-COLLATERALIZED LOANS 
-GENERAL PURPOSE LOANS 
11,119,211 
(262,678) 
(846.760) 
(2,382,530) 
(365,212) 
(7,262,031) 
1,802,100 16.21 252,249 
(46,056) (17.53) (13,024) 
(150,591) (17.78) (31,754) 
(379,504) (15.93) (40,565) 
(50,891) (13.93) (16,391) 
(1,175,058) (16.18) (150,515) 
2.27 
(4.96) 
(3.75) 
(1.70) 
(4.49) 
(2.07) 
114,742 
(6,175) 
(15,014) 
(18,638) 
(8,695) 
(66,220) 
1.03 
(2.35) 
(1.77) 
(0.78) 
(2.38) 
(0.91) 
366,991 
(19,199) 
(46,768) 
(59,203) 
(25,086' 
(216,735) 
3.30 
(7.31) 
(5.52) 
(2.48) 
(6.37) 
(2.98) 
1,427,346 
(36,179) 
(62,308) 
(396,917) 
(60,843) 
(871,099) 
12.84 
(13.77) 
(7.36) 
(16.66) 
(16.66) 
(11.99) 
1,794,337 16.14 
(55,378)(21.08) 
(109,076)(12.88) 
(456,120)(19.14) 
(85,929)(23.53) 
(1,087,834)(14.98) 
7,763 
(-9,322) 
(41,515) 
(-76,616) 
(-35,038) 
(87,224) 
0.07 
(3.55) 
(4.90) 
(-3.21) 
(-9.60) 
(1.20) 
CALL LOANS 4,026,311 753,835 18.72 2,852 0.07 1,163 0.03 4,015 0.10 554,573 13.77 558,588 13.87 195,247 4.85 
TOTAL 166,255,698 19,170,320 11.53 747,213 0.45 342,375 0.21 1,089,588 0.66 17,386,180 10.46 18,475,768 11.12 694,552 0.42 
TABLE 7 
KHB: COST OF FUNDS MOBILIZED 
1976 - BY ACCOUNT 
(W 000's) 
1 2 -3--HANDLING COSTS---4-------- 5 6 
AVG. 
BALANCE W 
INTEREST 
PAID . 
RATE 
----- SALARIES---------- OTHER------
7 % 
W RATE W RATE 
--------
W 
TOTAL----
% 
RATE 
TOTAL COST 
(2+5) 
W RATE 
CHECKING ACCOUNTS 
CASHIER's CHECKING 
PASSBOOK DEPOSIT 
HOUSEHOLD DEPOSIT 
CHILDREN's DEPOSIT 
NOTICE DEPOSIT 
TIME DEPOSIT 
TIME INSTALL. DEPOSIT 
SPECIAL HOUSEHOLD DEPOSIT 
FORTUNE FORMATION DEPOSIT 
HOUSING INSTALLMENT DEPOSIT 
CREDIT CONTROL DEPOSIT 
CALL LOANS 
AGENT ACCOUNT 
DOMESTIC EXCHANGE 
B.O.K. BORROWINGS 
SPECIAL BONDS 
HOUSING DEbirrTURES 
NATIONAL HOUSING BONDS 
HOUSING LOTTERIES 
CAPITAL 
1,318,785 
3,075,262 
8,737,966 
2,880,275 
165,523 
1,331,511 
24,208,878 
6,571,449 
2,929,487 
3,010,831 
10,102,060 
2,705,182 
69,634 
305,592 
215,400 
12,119,485 
921,131 
14,828,689 
53,691,000 
5,436,201 
2,188,020 
450 
-
113,046 
229,883 
11,969 
90,370 
4,094,297 
755,964 
625,126 
460,708 
1,161,120 
273,204 
11,335 
-
-
577,042 
50,801 
1,707,336 
3,395,734 
-
-
0.03 
-
1.29 
7.98 
7.23 
6.79 
16.91 
11.50 
21.34 
15.30 
11.49 
10.10 
16.28 
-
-
4.76 
5.52 
11.51 
6.33 
-
-
63,771 
190,428 
375,050 
214,526 
98,054 
19,275 
62,983 
205,242 
49,241 
205,159 
313,789 
18,109 
2,501 
11,571 
155,299 
2,501 
2,501 
18,452 
179,800 
73,133 
2,501 
4.84 
6.19 
4.29 
7.45 
59.24 
1.45 
0.26 
3.12 
1.68 
6.81 
3.11 
0.67 
3.59 
3.79 
72.10 
0.02 
0.27 
0.12 
0.33 
1.35 
0.11 
,820 
121,333 
215,845 
124,144 
45,383 
13,135 
76,050 
133,564 
28,986 
229,746 
167,991 
9,305 
1,024 
6,087 
97,363 
1,024 
1,024 
12,181 
195,411 
34,654 
1,024 
2.49 
3.95 
2.47 
4.31 
27.42 
0.99 
0.31 
2.03 
0.99 
7.63 
1.66 
0.34 
1.47 
1.99 
45.20 
0.01 
0.11 
0.08 
0.36 
0.64 
0.05 
96,591 
311,761 
590,895 
338,670 
143,437 
32,410 
139,033 
338,806 
78,227 
434,905 
481,780 
27,414 
3,525 
17,658 
252,662 
3,525 
3,525 
30,633 
375,211 
107,787 
3,525 
7.32 
10.14 
6.76 
11.76 
86.66 
2.43 
0.57 
5.16 
2.67 
14.44 
4.77 
1.01 
5.06 
5.78 
117.30 
0.03 
0.38 
0.20 
0.70 
1.98 
0.16 
97,041 
311,761 
703,941 
568,553 
155,406 
122.780 
4,233,330 
1,094,770 
703,353 
895,613 
1,642,900 
300,618 
14,860 
17,658 
252,662 
580,567 
54,326 
1,737,969 
3,770,945 
107,787 
3,525 
7.36 
10.14 
8.05 
19.74 
93.8' 
9.23 
17.48 
16.66 
24.01 
29.74 
16.26 
11.11 
21.34 
5.78 
117.30 
4.79 
5.90 
11.71 
7.02 
1.98 
0.16 
OTHERS 9,443,337 15,815 0.17 - - - - - - 15,815 0.17 
TOTAL 166,255,698 13,574,200 8.16 2,263,886 1.36 1,548,094 0.93 3,811,980 2.29 17,386,180 10.46 
